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Abstract: This paper examines the changing role of islands in the age of globalization and 
in an era of enhanced and diversified mobility. There are many types of islands, many 
metaphors of insularity, and many  types of migration, so the interactions are far  from 
simple.  The  ‘mobilities  turn’  in  migration  studies  recognizes  the  diversification  in 
motivations  and  time-space  regimes  of  human  migration.  After  brief  reviews  of  island 
studies and of migration studies, and the power of geography to capture and distil the 
interdisciplinarity and relationality of these two study domains, the paper explores various 
facets of the generally intense engagement that islands have with migration. Two particular 
scenarios are identified for islands and migration in the global era: the heuristic role of 
islands as ‘spatial laboratories’ for the study of diverse migration processes in microcosm; 
and the way in which, especially in the Mediterranean and near-Atlantic regions, islands 
have become critical locations in the geopolitics of irregular migration routes. The case of 
Malta is taken to illustrate some of these new insular migration dynamics. 
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Introduction 
 
Geography; islands; migration: a trio of academic fields which not only define in large 
measure the author’s own personal scholarly biography but also interlock in a triangle of 
creative interdisciplinarity.  Islands – areas of land surrounded entirely  by sea – are an 
obvious  geographical  entity,  unique  spaces  within  the  world’s  geography.  Migration  – 
human movement across space to live ‘elsewhere’ – is a process which is quintessentially 
geographical. Geography, then, is perfectly placed to capture the interdisciplinarity and 
relationality  of  these  two  relatively  new  fields  –  island  studies  and  migration  studies. 
Simultaneously  a  science,  social  science  and  a  humanities  subject,  geography  is  the 
broadest of disciplines. Indeed, perhaps it is a misnomer to call it a discipline; I would call 
it an ‘interdiscipline’. 
 
Islands and migration: what are the scales of the two phenomena under study? According 
to Baldacchino (2007: 1), some 600 million people, 10 per cent of the world’s population, 
live on islands; and islands, including archipelagos, make up one quarter of the world’s 
sovereign states. On the migration front, extrapolating from the latest estimates from the R. King 
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UN Population Division, there are 200 million international migrants in the world; that is 
to say, people currently residing in a country which is different from that of their birth. 
However, if migration within countries is included, the figure rises many-fold, but there are 
no global figures on internal migration. 
 
This  paper,  then,  is  about  the  relations  between  islands  and  migration,  seen  from  a 
geographer’s  broad  and  interdisciplinary  perspective.  It  is  in  six  parts.  First  I  say 
something about geographers’ engagement with the study of islands, which reflects the fact 
that most geographers regard islands as ‘special’ places with distinctive characteristics. At 
the same time, studying islands carries with it certain risks of escapism and of lack of 
serious commitment to the ‘big picture’ of world geography. Next I review in turn the two 
interdisciplinary fields of island studies and migration studies. Then I bring them together 
in  a  series  of  interactions  and  interfaces.  Islands  have  nearly  always  had  an  intense 
involvement  with  migration;  but  the  nature  of  this  engagement,  and  the  types  and 
sequences of migration that result are linked to the diverse historical roles that islands have 
played.  In  the  following  part  of  the  paper  I  develop  two  scenarios  for  island-based 
migration research: islands as strategic sites in the new geography of irregular migration 
routes, especially between Africa and Europe; and islands as spatial microcosms for the 
analysis of multiple migration processes and effects. The final section of the article takes 
Malta as an illustration of the two scenarios; Malta being an ideal case both because of the 
mix  of  different  types  of  migration  it  has  experienced,  and  because  of  its  new  role, 
connected with EU accession in 2004, of being on the front line of the arrival of boat-
migrants from North Africa. 
 
 
Geographers and Islands 
 
Islands have long attracted the attention of geographers (King, 1993). Particularly notable 
are the early-twentieth-century writings of the French geographers Jean Brunhes (1920) 
and Paul Vidal de la Blache (1926), continued later by the geo-historian Fernand Braudel 
whose magisterial treatise on the Mediterranean speaks at length on the special role of 
islands in Mediterranean economic, social and cultural history (Braudel, 1972: 148-167). 
Brunhes (1920: 52) saw islands as “little geographical worlds” wherein “by careful study 
of  a  small  unit  one  can  discern  and  evaluate  the  relations  between  physical  facts  and 
human destinies”. Ellen Churchill Semple, notorious for her controversial philosophy of 
environmental  determinism,  also  wrote  copiously  about  ‘island  people’  in  her  book 
Influences of the Geographic Environment. She described islands’ proneness to emigration: 
“A small cup soon overflows… herein lies [islands’] historical significance” (1911: 416). 
 
These  early  writings,  products  of  their  time,  opened  up  important  geographical 
perspectives on island studies – the concept of insularity, the special characteristics of 
island  populations  (including  what  we  would  call  today  their  identity),  pioneering 
ecological analyses, the historical dialectic between isolation and focalism, and cycles of 
landscape change due to colonialism and settlement, emigration and depopulation. 
                                                                        Geography, Islands and Migration 
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Later in the last century, islands became less fashionable as objects of geographical study. 
As geography went robustly through its normative, model-building, theory-seeking stage, 
the emphasis was on grand (but often abstract) generalizations. Islands fell off the map of 
geographical enquiry. In fact, five problems seemed to confront geographers (and others) 
studying islands, and these issues are still relevant today. 
 
•  Islands equate holidays, relaxation and having a nice time, not serious scholarship. 
When  I  tell  my  colleagues  (even  the  geographers)  that  I  am  going  to  Malta  and 
Cyprus (the two islands where I am currently conducting some research), or to the 
Azores for an international conference, they smile knowingly as if to say “Oh yeah?” 
I insist: there is no contradiction.  
 
•  The smallness of islands denotes insignificance; there are no ‘big questions’ on small 
islands, which are regarded as “irrelevant backwaters” and “somehow unimportant” 
(Hay, 2006: 21; Lowenthal, 1992: 18). But geography is not about size, or the built-in 
assumption that large spaces are more important than small ones. No, geography is 
about spaces and places at different scales, about relationships between the global 
and the local, and about spatial relations and connectivities (including, of course, 
migration) in which small islands are deeply embedded and have their place in the 
global-local nexus (Baldacchino, 2005: 248; Ratter & Sandner, 1996: 64). 
 
•  Studying  islands  invokes  an  academic  colonial  gaze  –  the  outsider,  ‘the  expert’, 
looking in. Baldacchino (2007: 2-3) calls this “islanding” (cf. ‘othering’): “a removal 
of  agency,  cheating  islanders  of  the  possibility  of  defining  themselves  and  of 
articulating  their  own  concerns  and  interests”.  Thus  academics,  in  acquiring  and 
possessing  the  knowledge  of  the  island,  contribute  yet  another  layer  to  islands’ 
histories of colonialism, whose most active agent today is probably tourism
1. Grant 
McCall’s  plea  that  islands  should  be  studied  on  their  own  terms  (1994,  1996) 
suggests an escape from academic colonialism and a process of empowerment in 
which islanders frame the research agenda and become active partners in the research 
process. However, McCall’s manifesto carries its own dilemmas, as we all shall see 
presently. 
 
•  The fallacy of regarding islands as small-scale models of the wider world. Brunhes 
(1920:  499)  wrote  that  island  studies  were  the  first  regional  monographs;  such 
comprehensive studies of “little worlds of humanity” pioneered the regional method 
in geography, leading to larger-scale studies of less definable mainland territories. 
Brookfield counters: “the common trap with island studies [is] of assuming that all 
islands are in some way a microcosm of the larger world. They are not” (1990: 31). 
There  is,  however,  a  middle  way.  Islands  can  be  studied  with  rigour,  both  for 
themselves, as geographical entities (like mountains, deserts, cities… ), and as places 
where,  under  relatively  controlled  conditions,  the  interrelationships  between  the 
island environment, histories of development and underdevelopment, population and 
                                                 
1 Of course, colonialism, tourism and academia cannot be equated in such a straightforward way. True, they 
all entail an outsider’s gaze, but the rationales and means of appropriation are very different. R. King 
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migration, can be studied in sharper focus. Herein lies the heuristic value of islands 
for geography. 
 
•  The danger of exceptionalism – of regarding islands as too special, too unique. This 
is  the  other  side  of  the  coin  of  the  previous  issue.  Here  we  are  faced  with  an 
essentialism of ‘islandness’ on the one hand, and on the other a blinkered myopia on 
the part of scholars about ‘their’ particular island which is somehow regarded  as 
different from all others. This can be overcome both by ‘horizontal’ comparative 
studies with other islands, and by ‘vertical’ integration of islands within hierarchies 
of regional and global relations. 
 
 
Island Studies 
 
Baldacchino (2004) has proclaimed the “coming of age” of island studies; but the essence 
of island studies remains both obvious and elusive. This reminds me of the old debate 
about  the  definition  of  geography,  which  often  fell  back  on  the  tautalogous  definition 
“geography is what geographers do”. And “what do geographers do?” “They study the 
world”. So it could be for islands. “What is island studies?” “It’s the study of islands.” 
What do island studies scholars study on islands?” “Everything”. This implies a ‘Jack-of-
all-trades’  approach  of  the  combined  geographer,  ecologist,  geologist,  anthropologist, 
sociologist, economist and historian, enabling island studies to be “the critical, inter- and 
pluri-disciplinary study of islands on their own terms” (Baldacchino, 2007: 16).  
 
Let me now head off at a bit of a tangent. Island studies seems to be a male domain (hence 
my use of ‘Jack’ above was deliberate), in contrast to migration studies which has become 
feminized,  as  we  shall  see  below.  Despite  (or  indeed  because  of)  the  fact  that  islands 
themselves, with their images of tropical climates and swaying palms, are often perceived 
as  ‘she’/female,  islands  are  objects  predominantly  of  the  male  gaze,  to  be  studied, 
objectified, collected and possessed. I know island aficionados (males, of course) whose 
islophilia  involves  visiting  as  many  islands  as  possible,  ticking  them  off  the  list,  and 
collecting the T-shirt to prove they have ‘been there’. Baldacchino (2007: 3-4) comments 
on the desire of the (almost inevitably male) visitor to circum-navigate the island, climb 
triumphantly to its highest point to ‘take it all in’, even to sing and shout. According to 
Hay (2006: 27) islands connect with metaphors of western masculinity, as well as literary 
classics ranging from Robinson Crusoe (Defoe 1719/1980) to D.H. Lawrence’s The Man 
who Loved Islands (1926/1982)
2. 
 
More prosaically, McCall (1994, 1996) has proposed the term nissology for “the scientific 
study of islands on their own terms”. Along with Baldacchino (2008a), I detect an inherent 
contradiction in this definition. McCall favours the islanders’ own emic perspective over 
                                                 
2 Recently, I reviewed Baldacchino’s A World of Islands (see King, 2008). The first few pages of the book 
are taken up by pictures of the book’s 23 main contributors – all but four are male, middle-aged or elderly 
and often bearded. Of course, I too fit that identikit! Another observation from the photo-gallery is that all 
authors  are  ‘white’,  which  certainly  does  not  reflect  the  ethno-racial  composition  of  the  world’s  island 
populations, but reinforces the Western, ‘colonial’ gaze of island-studies scholars.                                                                        Geography, Islands and Migration 
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the etic gaze of the outsider, but two problems arise. First, “scientific study” implies a set 
of orthodox research strategies which may override the islanders’ own view. Second, the 
division between islanders and non-islanders, insiders and outsiders, is not so clear-cut. 
Given islands’ long histories of migration, both in and out, who is an islander? What, 
therefore, is meant by “on their own terms”? Such a construction implies homogeneity and 
agreement within island communities, and overlooks divisions based on class, ethnicity or 
migration history.    
 
Another  approach  to  island  studies  is  through  the  notion  of  ‘islandness’  (Baldacchino, 
2004: 272-274), the key characteristics of which are usually listed as smallness, a strong 
sense of local or island culture and identity (typically implying  some tension with a larger 
‘mainland’),  peripherality,  and  a  sense  of  being  bounded  by  water.  But  parts  of  this 
framing of islands project a too-negative image, as Baldacchino himself acknowledges. 
The term ‘insularity’ carries problematic connotations of isolation and inward-lookingness, 
whereas  many  islanders  are  very  outward-looking,  by  their  very  nature  as  islanders. 
Peripherality is both relative and subject to change, as well as being multi-dimensional. 
Taking Europe as an example, the economic geography of core and periphery under one 
system  (the  Fordist  model,  for  instance),  may  become  partially  inverted  under  another 
economic model, based on tourism, light industry and financial services. The ‘Celtic Tiger’ 
economy  of  Ireland  is  a  case  in  point,  propelling  the  country  within  a  decade  from  a 
relatively poor status (by European standards) to one of the continent’s most prosperous 
and dynamic member-states. Or consider Ibiza: transformed from a rural, semi-subsistence 
economy to the youth tourism clubbing capital of Europe.  
 
A third angle on island studies which is quite prominent, especially in the geographical 
literature, is the ‘spatial laboratories’ approach, the dangers and possibilities of which I 
noted  earlier,  including  the  fallacy  of  regarding  islands  as  miniature  replicas  of  the 
mainland or as closed systems. Nevertheless islands have long been productively utilized 
as  a  semi-laboratory  setting  for  the  study  of  ecological,  epidemiological  and  social 
processes, including migration (Connell & King, 1999; King, 1999). 
 
As  regards  migration,  two  further  approaches  to  islandness  are  especially  relevant  – 
economics and demographics. There is now an extensive literature on the economic and 
developmental problems of small islands, some of which overlaps with economic analyses 
of small states (see, inter alia, Baldacchino & Greenwood, 1998; Baldacchino & Milne, 
2000; Bertram & Poirine, 2007; Biagini & Hoyle, 1999; Briguglio, 1995; Connell, 1988; 
Dommen & Hein, 1985; Hintjens & Newitt, 1992; Lockhart et al., 1993). Undoubtedly, 
smallness and insularity bequeath a range of economic handicaps
3: the small size of the 
local market for goods and services; the limited range of island products due to the narrow 
resource base; high transport costs for both exports and imports; vulnerability to world 
market prices; risk of crop failure due to exposure to natural disasters such as drought, 
hurricane  or  diseases;  and  the  limited  or  ‘truncated’  local  labour  market  with  few 
opportunities for highly educated or ambitious young people. Emigration often becomes 
                                                 
3 There is a danger of conflating smallness and insularity: the two are not always related. Ireland, Britain and 
Australia are all associated with narratives of insularity, island identity and ‘island race’, yet they are far from 
small. R. King 
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the  response  to  these  economic  vulnerabilities;  labour  becomes  the  ‘monocrop’  to  be 
exported to the global market, as Schneider and Schneider (1976) showed in the context of 
western Sicily, where workers replaced wheat as the major export product. Especially for 
smaller islands, the end-result is often the MIRAB economic model, whereby migration, 
remittances, aid and bureaucracy are the key parameters (Bertram & Watters, 1985; for 
updates see Bertram, 2006; Bertram & Poirine, 2007). 
 
But this is not the whole story. Islanders’ supposed condition of poverty and economic 
vulnerability is countered by the fact that island states’ GDP per capita is above the world 
average,  and  small  island  states  are  disproportionately  numerous  amongst  higher  and 
upper-middle income countries (Read, 2004). The economic riddle is solved by islands’ 
skills  in  identifying  high-income-earning  niche  products  and  services  in  the  global 
economy, trading on the economic nimbleness which is perhaps easier to exercise from a 
small-scale jurisdiction (Bernard & Poirine, 2007). Islands thus exemplify post-industrial 
spaces  where  flexible  specialization  is  the  watchword  and  where  a  higher  level  of 
connectivity  to  the  global  system  can  be  capitalized  upon.  Tourism,  including  niche 
tourism, and financial services, especially offshore banking, seem to be the key sectors for 
many islands’ prosperity, although such activities are, in turn, not without their risks and 
limits. Tourism and banking are themselves subject to market volatility, and not every 
island  is  equipped  climatically  for  tourism,  or  knowledge-wise  for  financial  industries. 
Tourism in particular brings its own problems of seasonality, disruption of island lifestyles, 
external  ownership  and  environmental  pressure  –  there  is  extensive  literature  on  these 
issues (e.g. Apostolopolous & Gayle, 2002; Briguglio et al., 1996a, 1996b; Gössling, 2003; 
Gössling & Wall, 2007; Lockhart & Drakakis-Smith, 1997). 
 
The  final  analytical  field  within  island  studies  –  one  which  has  a  close  bearing  on 
migration – is the socio-demographic perspective. Many small islands evolve relatively 
homogenous  and  intimate  societies  with  a  strong  sense  of  common  identity.  Everyone 
knows everyone else, at least as an acquaintance or through common friends, and there is 
an equally close knowledge of the local environment – every house, every field, every 
track,  every  beach  is  known  and  recognized
4 .  Population  growth  may  stretch  this 
equilibrium in various ways, leading ultimately to out-migration. Pressure on the land, 
meantime, can provide the stimulus to construct elaborate terrace systems, seen in various 
parts of the world: in Java for instance where the progressive increase in the population led 
to a parallel intensification of the agricultural ecosystem with spectacular rice terraces and 
minutely  managed  irrigation  systems,  a  process  called  by  Clifford  Geertz  (1963) 
agricultural  involution.  Elaborate  terraces  for  vines  and  other  crops  are  also  found 
throughout the Mediterranean and Macaronesian archipelagos; perhaps most spectacularly 
on  Madeira.  Eventually,  the  demographic  momentum  may  overshoot,  projecting  the 
population beyond the island’s carrying capacity at the level of technology and economic 
resources that the island possesses at the time, and emigration results. This leads to new 
cycles of demographic, social, economic and landscape change which have been copiously 
analysed in the literature on island migrations (for overviews see Connell, 2007; Connell & 
King, 1999; King 1999). Return migration may cushion the long-term demographic and 
                                                 
4 This condition, one must acknowledge, also applies to villages, studied through the classic anthropological 
condition of the ‘small-scale’.                                                                        Geography, Islands and Migration 
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economic  decline  somewhat,  but  much  depends  on  the  age  of  the  returnees  and  the 
financial and human capital they bring back. 
 
Migration Studies 
 
One of the justifications for the ‘coming of age’ of island studies as a recognized academic 
field is the existence now of two MA programmes (at the University of Prince Edward 
Island and the University of Malta) and three dedicated journals, the peer-reviewed Island 
Studies Journal, which started in 2006, Shima: The International Journal of Research into 
Island Cultures, started in 2007, and the longer-established (since 1992) but less academic 
Insula, published with the support of UNESCO (Robertson, 2007: 576-577). 
 
On  these  criteria,  ‘migration  studies’  is  an  older  and  more  broadly  established 
interdisciplinary  field.  The  first  MA  in  Migration  Studies  started  at  the  University  of 
Sussex twelve years ago, and there are many such programmes now, especially in Britain 
and Europe, including some specialized masters’ such as Oxford’s MSc in Refugee Studies. 
The three leading journals in the field – International Migration, International Migration 
Review and the Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies – have been running since 1962, 
1966 and 1974 respectively. New journals are founded every year, it seems, one of the 
latest and most interesting being Mobilities, launched in 2006
5. 
 
The literature on migration studies is truly vast and growing exponentially. Following my 
approach in the previous section, I signpost some key themes and perspectives. 
 
Migration is usually defined as the movement of people from one place or country to 
another, for a significant period of time such as more than one year. It is, thus, both a 
spatial event and a temporal one; but also to some extent an artifice of the spatio-temporal 
thresholds that have to be crossed for migration to be said to have taken place. For the 
statistical measurement of migration, boundaries have to be crossed (international frontiers, 
or  internal  administrative  boundaries  such  as  provinces  or  municipalities),  and  certain 
time(s) elapsed before the move is ‘registered’. Hence the measurement of migration is far 
from  uniform  across  the  world.  Thresholds  are  arbitrary  and  open  to  different 
interpretations in different places. In the United States, for instance, a move from one street 
to another within a city, or from one rural area to another within a county, might not be 
conventionally regarded (or statistically recorded) as migration; it might instead be called 
‘residential relocation’. Time, too, is arbitrary and situation-dependent when it comes to 
migration. The one-year criterion noted above – which is commonly used by migration 
scholars and national and international statistical agencies – leaves out seasonal migrations 
whose  movement  regimes  are  more  short-term  but  no  less  significant,  both  to  the 
individuals  concerned  and  in  terms  of  their  contribution  to  the  overall  map  of  global 
human mobility. 
 
Although migration has been a constant feature of humankind throughout history (King, 
1996, 2007), the academic study of migration really only started with the industrial age 
                                                 
5 Others  are  the  Journal  of  International  Migration  and  Integration  (2000),  Journal  of  Immigrant  and 
Refugee Studies (2003), and Migrations and Identities (2008). R. King 
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(Boyle  et  al.,  1998:  59).  It  was  the  geographer  Edward  Ravenstein  who  made  the 
foundational statement about migration studies in his famous ‘laws of migration’ (1885, 
1889), still widely referred to today. Ravenstein’s eleven laws – which are really empirical 
generalizations  rather  than  laws  sensu  strictu  –  showed  migration  to  be  essentially 
economically  driven,  both  in  terms  of  individuals’  motivation  and  with  regard  to  the 
relative levels of development of sending areas (poor, rural, with limited opportunities) and 
the receiving contexts (urban, industrial, commercial, and with more opportunities). One of 
his laws – that females are more migratory than males, particularly over shorter distances – 
passed almost unnoticed at the time but has been shown to have special relevance in recent 
years. I refer here to the feminization of migration, by which I mean three things. First, 
females  make  up  an  increasing  share  of  total  migrants.  Nowadays,  females  comprise 
almost exactly half (49%) of all international migrants: although, to be fair, and this was 
Ravenstein’s  point,  females  have  always  been  prominent  in  migration  streams  (it  was 
simply that they were ‘ignored’ by theories and narratives which constructed migration as 
a ‘male’ process). Secondly, women have increased agency in migration; that is to say they 
are increasingly migrating independently of men and often as leaders of migration chains. 
This  is  in  contrast  to  the  past  where  they  were  more  likely  to  be  (constructed  as) 
‘followers’ or ‘accompaniers’ of the ‘pioneering’ male migrants. And thirdly, the study of 
migration has become feminized. Whilst it is true that the older generation of migration 
scholars (like island studies scholars) remains resolutely male-majority, amongst younger 
researchers there is a distinctive majority of females. In contrast, then, to the masculinist 
gaze of island studies, the study of migration is increasingly, and predominantly, carried 
out by (young) women
6. 
 
Of course, there is much more that could be said about migration; far more than can even 
be hinted at here. Let me just make a few key points. Following Castles & Miller (2003: 
21), I make a distinction between the act of migration, and migration’s consequences; or 
between causes and effects. This has special relevance to islands where the causes and 
consequences of migration may be clearly separated in space and time. Causes embody 
several fundamental questions. Why do people migrate? Who migrates? And where do 
they move to? The effects fall into two groups: impacts of migration on the places/islands 
‘left behind’ (depopulation, demographic distortion, brain drain, loss of labour etc.); and 
the formation of migrant communities in the places of destination (such as the preservation 
of  ‘island  identity’,  integration  into  the  ‘host  society’,  and  possible  return  ‘home’). 
However, the separation between causes and consequences is not absolute. Consequences 
can become causes, for example when depopulation (an effect) causes further outmigration 
because  of  the  declining  market  base  for  economic  activities,  or  declining  morale. 
Likewise, the return to the island of ‘successful’ migrants can act as a stimulus to further 
migration through the ‘demonstration effect’. 
 
                                                 
6 Here is some anecdotal statistical evidence to support this statement. Of the twelve years’ worth of students 
I have taught on the Sussex MA in Migration Studies (around 150 students in all), nine out of ten have been 
female. I also acknowledge that this trend is part of a progressive feminization of higher education in the UK 
and many other countries.                                                                        Geography, Islands and Migration 
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‘Cause’  and  ‘effect’  is  only  one  of  a  number  of  binaries  which  dissect  the  study  of 
migration. In practice, these dichotomies are often blurred, as the following examples show 
(King, 2002).   
 
Forced  vs.  voluntary  is  a  common  division  in  migration  studies,  used  particularly  to 
address  the  distinction  between  refugees  and  so-called  ‘economic  migrants’.  In  recent 
years the latter term has come to have a negative connotation in the media and in political 
rhetoric (especially in the UK), and has become infused with implications of ‘illegality’ 
and ‘bogus’ asylum claims (Kaye, 2001). Of course, there are migrations which are easily 
classifiable either side of this binary. The forced evacuation of the population of Diego 
García in the Indian Ocean to make way for a US military base is an obvious example 
(Vine, 2004). Equally clear-cut as an instance of voluntary migration is the ‘retirement 
migration’ of older British and German citizens to islands such as Majorca and Tenerife 
(Casado-Díaz et al., 2004). But a great deal of migration that takes place in the world lies 
between  these  two  extremes  and  blurs  the  forced/voluntary  divide.  The  history  of 
migration from many Caribbean islands, especially in the early post-war decades, is a good 
illustration. Migrants were not coerced to leave as such, but were, in effect, driven to 
emigrate by powerful economic imperatives. For the poor and unemployed, emigration 
was the only ‘way out’ of destitution and the only route to achieve a measure of well-being. 
 
A further important dichotomy is that between internal and international migration. As 
Skeldon (2006: 16-17) points out, these amount to “two migration traditions” based on 
different  datasets,  theoretical  assumptions  and  analytical  methods,  producing  different 
literatures and linked to different policy arenas. Yet this dichotomy is, in practice, blurred 
– for instance when the same migrant moves both internally and then internationally (or 
vice-versa),  or  when  boundaries  change,  so  that  former  internal  migrants  become 
international migrants (as in Yugoslavia before and after the creation of new independent 
states in the 1990s). 
 
Introducing the island dimension further complicates, but also illuminates, this division of 
scale and type of migration. Imagine an archipelago made up of larger and smaller islands, 
not an independent state but part of a country whose main territory is a ‘mainland’: the 
Azores is a good example. The following scale hierarchy of migrations may be observed: 
 
•  intra-island migration – especially on a large island like São Miguel, there will be 
local-scale migrations from remote villages or hamlets to the capital Ponta Delgada 
and other main towns; 
 
•  inter-island  migration  –  for  instance  from  smaller  islands  like  Santa  Maria  or 
Graciosa to larger ones such as São Miguel or Terceira; 
 
•  migration to the mainland – this is still internal migration within the same country 
(Portugal) but may involve considerable distances and ‘dislocations’; 
 
•  migration to another country – this could either be on the same continental mainland 
as the country to which the archipelago belongs (i.e. another European country such R. King 
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as France – actually this is not an important destination for Azoreans although it has 
been  for  Portuguese  emigrants),  or  another  country  in  another  continent  (in  the 
Azorean case, most emigration has been to the United States and Canada, plus some 
other countries such as Brazil and Bermuda). 
 
Once again, we need to acknowledge that these migration trajectories are not necessarily 
mutually  exclusive  alternatives  but  can  be  combined  in  an  individual’s  migratory 
biography in various sequences, perhaps interleaved by return migration(s), or they can be 
experienced by different members of the same family. Nor is the above list an exhaustive 
typology: reverse migration flows, such as return from abroad, or the movement into rural 
island spaces of dissatisfied urban refugees, are also part of the migration dynamics. 
 
Finally,  to  bring  this  briefest  of  overviews  of  migration  studies  up  to  date,  two  new 
paradigms  have  coursed  through  the  field  over  the  past  15-20  years.  Both  reflect  the 
broader phenomenon of globalization and its effect on mobility and identity. The first is 
the transnationalist approach (see Basch et al., 1994 for the definitive study), which has, 
to some extent, rejuvenated the older tradition of diaspora studies (Vertovec & Cohen, 
1999).  Transnational  migrants  are  immigrants  who  engage  in  regular  and  sustained 
activities  linking  them back  to  their  homeland.  It is  not  enough  to  be  an  international 
migrant  to  be  transnational:  the  key  criterion  is  that  transnational  activities  (sending 
remittances, making return visits, supporting hometown associations, trading goods, close 
communication with kin back home etc.) are a central part of a migrant’s life. With their 
usually strong islander identity, it is often the case that island-origin emigrants have strong 
transnational identities, although translocal might be a better descriptor. As the title of one 
of my co-edited books indicates, island migrants come from ‘small worlds’ yet lead ‘global 
lives’ (King & Connell, 1999). Their global lives are rooted in the small place that is 
‘their’ island, whose community they still see themselves part of, even if their returns are 
sporadic or negligible (Felgentreff, 1999). As a popular Azorean saying goes, “Azoreans 
always carry their island on their backs” (Williams & Fonseca, 1999: 67). And it is no 
accident that some of the pioneering studies of transnational migrants in the US are based 
on islander migrants, notably Dominicans and Haitians (see Glick-Schiller & Fouron, 1998; 
Guarnizo, 1994, 1997; Itzigsohn et al., 1999). 
 
The second, and more recent, new paradigm in migration studies is the ‘mobilities turn’ 
(Sheller & Urry, 2006; Urry, 2000) which not only stresses the defining role of mobility in 
postmodern societies but also frames migration as one of a continuum of mobility types, 
including  travel,  tourism,  circulation,  sequential migration,  and  virtual  mobilities.  Urry 
(2000) and Beck & Beck Gernsheim (2002) argue that what characterizes global society, 
and  especially  the  more  advanced  societies  of  the  world  today,  is  not  the  old  ‘fixed’ 
categories of class, residence, career-based employment, family and kinship, but rather 
individualization and mobility. People increasingly story their lives not so much as who 
they are, what they do and where they live, but recount where they have been and where 
they want to go. Thus, alongside the recognized ‘forms of capital’ – financial, human, 
social, cultural (Bourdieu, 1986) – we can now consider mobility capital. Islands feature 
prominently in these new ‘mobilityscapes’, both as origins (islanders who want to leave,                                                                        Geography, Islands and Migration 
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‘see the world’ and return) but more especially as destinations for tourism, travel, escapism, 
‘dropping out’, ‘moving in and moving on’, and so on. 
 
Like other forms of capital, the distribution of mobility capital is highly uneven. How 
people deploy their mobility capital depends on whether they are rich or poor, and on 
where in the world they were born and hence what ‘mobility rights’ they have. It is an 
irony that, in this supposedly globalized world of free movement (of goods, capital, ideas, 
and so on), one of the key factors of production – labour, people – is subject to draconian 
regimes of migration control. Or rather, certain categories of people (the wealthy, those 
from ‘the West’, people of certain ethnicities) are free to migrate, whereas others are not 
(the  poor,  the  uneducated,  people  of  colour,  from  the  less  developed  world).  This 
polarization in access to mobility seems to be getting worse, so that there is an increasing 
gap between the aspiration to migrate and the ability to do so (Carling, 2002). Castles & 
Miller (2003) write that we live in “the age of migration”, but this need to be qualified: an 
age of migration for some, but not for others. 
 
 
Migration and Islands 
 
I rack my brains and I cannot recall any definitive study of migration from an island where 
the island dimension is central to the study. (Of course, there have been very many studies 
of migration from islands, but none are truly canonical). If we look at accounts of the 
history of migration, we find them dominated  by the so-called ‘great  migrations’ – of 
slavery, indenture, colonial settlement, labour migration (King, 1996). Islands have been 
involved in all these but are not a key part of the grand narrative. 
 
Yet there is no doubt that islands have nearly always had an intense engagement with 
migration – settled by migration in the first place and often deeply affected by migration 
thereafter.  The  rates  and  indices  of  migration  on  islands  –  especially  as  regards 
emigration/outmigration – are certainly higher than ‘mainland’ countries or regions (even 
if no-one has made the exact calculations). The intensity, types and chronological sequence 
of migration depend on the historical roles that islands have played. In a previous essay 
(King, 1999) I drew a simple contrast between two historical roles: islands as marginal 
spaces, and as nodal places. Nodal islands tend to attract and exchange population, leading 
to  the  creation  of  cosmopolitan,  hybrid  and  stratified  societies,  often  with  an  ‘open’ 
mentality towards the outside world. Marginal islands tend eventually to become areas of 
outmigration and depopulation, leading to the MIRAB syndrome described earlier. 
 
But  marginal  vs.  nodal  is  a  too-simplistic  dichotomy  of  islands  in  the  current  global 
scenario. Bertram & Poirine (2007) show that the smaller and more isolated the island, the 
greater  the  need  to  be  open  to  the  world  market  and  to  specialize  in  a  narrow  set  of 
revenue-generating  activities.  For  successful  small-island  economies,  the  keywords  are 
specialization and flexibility;  especially the  ability to make  rapid switches to new and 
profitable specialized economic niches. Bertram & Poirine (2007: 333-335) point to the 
rapid shift of the Cayman Islands from a classic MIRAB economy to a financial services 
and tax haven powerhouse within a decade. Hence the Cayman Islands have virtually no R. King 
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emigration and, instead, attract in-migrants and visitors from near and far (Connell, 1994). 
These authors demonstrate that the economic vulnerability index (a measure of the narrow 
range of economic activities), based on data from 69 island economies, is positively not 
negatively correlated to per capita income. 
 
Warrington & Milne (2007) proffer a more sophisticated typology of islands, based on 
governance  and  historical  relationship  to  the  ‘world  system’.  Below,  I  follow  their 
sevenfold typology, making connections to different histories of migration. These types are 
by no means mutually exclusive, and certain islands can fulfil different roles at different 
points in their history, or exhibit a combination of roles simultaneously. 
 
First come islands of civilization, of which, in modern times, there are just two, Britain and 
Japan, both large archipelagic countries. Through trade and conquest, these islands have 
generated global economic and cultural power, and an insular autonomy and hegemony 
that are the very antithesis of the vulnerability  so often regarded as typical of islands. 
Linked to their imperial political and economic projects, these islands’ migrations are those 
of  colonial  and  trading  settlement.  Later,  especially  in  the  case  of  the  UK,  labour  in-
migration  from  the  (former)  colonies  and  other  poor  countries  becomes  characteristic, 
driven by the demands for labour that a highly prosperous capitalist society generates. 
 
Next we have islands of settlement: these are settler colonies which are recipients of the 
colonial migrants referred to immediately above. For Britain, they were, above all, the 
‘white dominion’ islands of New Zealand and the island-continent of Australia. Iceland is 
another example, from another imperial realm. Their role has been one of thinly populated 
territories capable of absorbing surplus population from the colonial homeland, mainly 
through voluntary and often sponsored and subsidized migration. 
 
Third  are plantation  islands,  also  a  product  of  the  colonial  era,  but  this  time  as  more 
subordinate elements, supplying a narrow range of commodities to the imperial homeland. 
Typical plantation products were sugar, cotton, coffee, tea, spices and valuable minerals. 
This  hyper-specialization  persists  in  the  form  of  other  ‘monocrops’  –  hydrocarbons, 
tourism  and  (arguably)  offshore  finance.  Economic  vulnerability  remains  a  structural 
characteristic  of  plantation  islands,  not  just  because  of  narrow  specialization  and 
dependence  on  world  market  prices  for  primary  products  (which  have  generally  been 
falling), but also because of heavy concentration of ownership of the means of production 
either in the hands of a local plantocracy or in multinational corporations (Warrington & 
Milne,  2007:  411).  Migration-wise,  such  islands  are  characterized  by  a  history  of 
involuntary immigration of slaves and indentured labour, which has bequeathed a racially 
structured unequal society. When the economy collapses, mass emigration results; labour 
becomes the monocrop to be exported. Many of the island states and dependent territories 
of the Caribbean (and also some in the Indian and Pacific Oceans) conform to this regime 
of political economy and migration. 
 
Islands as fiefs share some of the historical, economic and migration characteristics of 
plantation islands. Fief islands are the polar opposite to islands of civilization. They are 
defined by extreme peripherality and vulnerability compounded by a history of rapacious                                                                        Geography, Islands and Migration 
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exploitation  by  local  and  external  elites.  Sicily  and  Haiti  are  archetypal  fief  islands, 
afflicted by a set of structures which are inimical to development – mafia organizations, 
extreme  traditionalism,  violence,  corruption  and  illegitimate  exercise  of  power.  Irish 
history before 1921 is also often defined in terms of being a British protestant fiefdom. 
Wholesale emigration, often under traumatic circumstances (cf. the Irish famine of the 
mid-1840s), is the accompanying consequence as the only ‘way out’. 
 
Next comes the island as fortress; a site for protecting and projecting power. Malta is the 
exemplar, but there are other cases such as St. Lucia in the eighteenth century, Singapore 
during the interwar  years, and Hong Kong prior to its transfer to China. Colonial and 
military power are the key to the raison d’être of the fortress island, based on a fortuitous 
combination of strategic location, maritime and air travel technology (which of course can 
change), and trade and military routes. According to Warrington & Milne, the pattern of 
governance  of  fortress  islands  is  replete  with  paradoxes:  “economic  affluence  and 
vulnerability; competent, benign administration but fractious politics; a cockpit of imperial 
politics, but a weak sense of domestic interests” (2007: 407). The build-up of the fortress 
economy usually involves some military in-migration, but then mass emigration (as in 
post-war Malta) follows when the fortress function wanes. 
 
Entrepôt  islands  exhibit  a  clear  nodal  vocation.  Locationally  entrepôts  benefit  from 
nearness to incoming trade routes, functioning as a semi-detached entry-point for adjacent 
mainlands; but internal sources of entrepôt success derive from investment finance and 
entrepreneurial  flair,  and  a  regulatory  regime  that  facilitates  market  transactions  by 
minimizing costs and risks. Warrington & Milne (2007: 413) quote Singapore, the Channel 
Islands, the Isle of Man and Mauritius as examples of this island political economy. For 
others  –  Barbados,  Malta,  Ireland  –  the  entrepôt  function  may  take  over  from  other 
political  economies  –  respectively  plantation,  fortress  or  fief.  The  entrepôt  trades  on 
commerce and investment rather on large-scale migration, but a combination of emigration 
and immigration, especially of wealthy merchants, entrepreneurs and tax exiles, is to be 
expected. 
 
Finally there are islands of refuge,  which are  conceived  as bulwarks against dominant 
mainland powers. Cuba (against the USA) and Taiwan (against mainland China) are the 
classic examples, defining themselves ideologically against the alter ego: socialism against 
capitalism, democracy against autocracy. They are characterized by migrations of refuge, 
both in and out. 
 
 
Islands, Migration and Globalization: Two Scenarios 
 
Set against the dual background of the current era as both the age of globalization and the 
age of migration, and with my main geographical reference being the Mediterranean Sea 
and  the  adjacent  eastern  Atlantic,  I  pull  out  two  research  scenarios  for  islands  and 
migration. 
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The first focuses on the new and key functions of islands as strategic locations in the 
geopolitics of irregular migration, especially  as regards the movement of ‘clandestine’ 
migrants between Africa and Europe. Many migrants seeking to enter Europe are engaged 
in long and tortuous journeys lasting several months or even years: their origins lie far to 
the south of the African shore and the target destinations may be countries beyond the 
southern European coasts and islands. Indeed, as ‘transit migrants’ involved in ‘fragmented 
journeys’, their country of destination may not be determined when they leave home; it 
may change en route according to opportunities that present themselves; or, indeed, they 
may never get there but be blocked in some intermediate location (Collyer, 2007: 668). 
Poor  migrants  (and  not-so-poor  migrants,  given  that  irregular  migration  involves 
substantial costs of travel and smugglers’ fees) are increasingly driven by ‘push pressures’ 
to depart from their home countries which are often in political or economic chaos; yet 
they  are  confronted  by  global/European  regimes  of  migration  control  and  border 
securitization which make entry into ‘Fortress Europe’ ever more difficult and dangerous. 
As new routes of ‘least resistance’ are increasingly sought out by migrants and smugglers, 
certain  islands  offer  themselves  as  strategically-located  staging-posts  and  entry-points, 
especially those which are part of the European Union and yet are close to the ‘launching 
pads’ of migration in Morocco, Tunisia,  Libya etc. In this new strategic  geography of 
irregular migration, Lampedusa (the tiny outpost island of Sicily and Italy), Malta, and the 
eastern Canary Islands (especially Fuerteventura) are the most attractive stepping-stones 
into Europe. 
 
The attractiveness, but also dangers, of islands as key sites in the journeys of irregular 
migrants are all-too evident when we think of the precise spatialities of migration routes 
and migration control. Controlling a maritime border is fundamentally different and more 
difficult than a land border because it requires surveillance of an area (the sea) rather than 
just a line (Carling, 2007a: 324). Compared to land borders, with their checkpoints at road 
crossings and airports, and the possibility of erecting physical borders such as fences and 
walls, sea borders are more open and access can be stealthier, under cover of darkness. 
‘Search and rescue’ zones make it possible, even obligatory, for migrants in overloaded 
boats who are in mortal danger to be picked up and ‘taken in’, with the chance that they 
will not be repatriated. The dangers derive from storms and currents overturning the flimsy 
boats  or  driving  them  off-course,  engine  failure,  poor  navigational  skills,  shortage  or 
absence  of  life-jackets,  inability  to  swim,  as  well  as  the  unscrupulous  behaviour  of 
smugglers and pilots who may abandon migrants too far from the shore to the peril of 
those who cannot swim. All this has been amply documented, not so much in academic 
studies (but see Carling, 2007a), but in a plethora of newspaper and NGO reports
7. 
                                                 
7  See  for  example  the  monthly  newsletter  of  PICUM  (Platform  for  International  Cooperation  on 
Undocumented  Migrants)  which  has  regular  reports  and  statistics  on  ‘Death  at  the  Border’.  Routes  and 
tragedies regularly reported on involve the Greek islands close to the Turkish coast, Sicily and Lampedusa, 
Malta, and the Canary Islands. The November 2004 Newsletter reported an authoritative estimate that 2,000 
migrants drown every year in the Mediterranean trying to cross to Europe – half the world total of migrant 
deaths at sea. From 2004 on, reports on sea drownings increasingly feature the Canaries. The January 2005 
Newsletter  carried  the  following  harrowing  account:  “The  Spanish  coast  guard  came  across  a  group  of 
undocumented sub-Saharan migrants in a small boat off the coast of Fuerteventura (Canary Islands) on 23 
December. Thirteen were dead and the remaining 30 passengers were rescued. Six of the survivors were in a 
serious condition. Rescue officials said that the scene on the boat was one of horror because the dead and                                                                        Geography, Islands and Migration 
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Carling  (2007a,  2007b)  and  Collyer  (2007)  have  recently  documented  the  evolving 
geography and technology of migration control in the Mediterranean and near-Atlantic 
seas. The imposition by the Spanish authorities, with EU backing, of the SIVE surveillance 
system (Sistema Integrado de Vigilancia Exterior) across the Gibraltar Strait in 2002 made 
the short-sea crossing between Morocco and Spain, which for years had been crossed by 
thousands of Moroccan and other migrants in flimsy pateras (makeshift wooden boats), 
increasingly  less  feasible.  This  had  the  effect  of  deflecting  the  main  routes  for  transit 
migration between Africa and Europe: eastwards to the stretch of Moroccan coast between 
the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla, with migrants aiming at the coast of Granada 
and Almería; and south-westwards down the Atlantic coast of Morocco, aiming at Cadiz. 
Application of SIVE to the entire Andalusia coast then forced migrants even further south 
and  east.  Routes  developed  in  the  early-mid  2000s  from  southern  Morocco,  Western 
Sahara and Mauritania to the Canaries, initially aimed at Fuerteventura, the closest to the 
African coast, but then, after a partial introduction of SIVE, to Lanzarote, Gran Canaria 
and Tenerife. As surveillance intensified off these coasts, longer-distance routes have very 
recently sprung up, involving the Cape Verde islands far to the south. Meanwhile, far to 
the east, a new maritime bridgehead opened up for irregular migrants transiting  Libya 
towards Sicily and Malta, the latter a new EU entrant in the 2004 enlargement. The case of 
Malta will be dealt with in the final section of the paper. 
 
Before that, I turn to the second island research scenario. This harks back to the remarks 
made  earlier  about  the  heuristic  value  of  islands  as  small-scale  laboratories  for  the 
analysis of societal processes and interactions, but it also has a contrastive connection 
with the first scenario just outlined. The first scenario was mainly about poor migrants 
travelling without papers, searching out viable routes to access rich European countries to 
find work and improve their lives and those of their family members back home. We saw 
how  some  islands  have  acquired  great  locational  significance  in  this  new  migration 
geography.  However,  for  individuals  at  the  other  end  of  the  global  wealth  spectrum, 
islands become ‘playground spaces’, to visit as tourists or on yachts or cruises, to buy 
second homes (or third or fourth homes…), or even to buy the whole island! The invasion 
of foreign capital to buy island property sets in motion a process of island gentrification 
which has been imaginatively documented for the Swedish islands around Gothenburg and 
Stockholm by Clark et al. (2007), and also for Capri (Mazetti, 2007). According to local 
estate agents, the Swedish market for property on islands has become ‘hysterical’, such is 
the demand (Clark et al., 2007: 483). Meanwhile, on the isle of Capri, whose origins as a 
holiday playground can be traced back to Roman times, building land costs between 6,000 
and 10,000 euros per square metre, depending on the site and the view. These are real-
estate values comparable to many central-city locations, so that Capri has in effect become 
a luxury residential district of metropolitan Naples, to which it is connected by fast and 
frequent hydrofoil services (Mazetti, 2007: 612). 
 
                                                                                                                                                    
living had to share the boat and some survivors were clutching the bodies. The survivors were suffering from 
dehydration and hypothermia after their boat had drifted at sea for three days without fuel, food or water”. In 
the  February  2006  Newsletter  it  was  reported  that,  during  2005,  226  undocumented  migrants  had  died 
crossing to the Canary Islands. R. King 
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In this role, and very different from the vision of desperate migrants, bedraggled on the 
shores of Lampedusa or Fuerteventura, islands offer an altogether more romantic image 
which builds on ‘the island’ as a constant visual and metaphorical trope of tourism and 
relaxation.  Islands  embody  unique  small  spaces  where  peace  and  quiet,  environmental 
purity and pristine landscapes and seascapes are especially targeted by rich people, retirees 
and dreamers who have the wherewithal to relocate there, at least for part of their lives. 
 
All these migration types – rich and poor migrants, short-stayers and long-stayers, tourists 
and retirees etc. – can be located together on many islands such as Tenerife, Gran Canaria, 
Majorca, Malta or Cyprus. To a greater or lesser extent, they all interact both with the host 
society and with each other. To be more categorical, we can recognize the following actor 
groups in this scenario: 
 
•  island-born  non-migrants  –  who  are  nevertheless  profoundly  affected  by  the 
migration of other islanders, as well as the presence of immigrants; 
 
•  internal migrants within an archipelago – these may not be immediately recognizable 
but may partly contribute to define the boundaries of ‘belonging’; 
 
•  emigrants – who may make regular return visits and continue to see themselves as 
part of the island community; 
 
•  returned migrants – who may have returned temporarily or for good; 
 
•  tourists and visitors – ranging from short-stay tourists and cruise-ship passengers to 
those who have second homes where they may stay for several months a year; 
 
•  immigrants from wealthy countries, who may be retirees; and 
 
•  immigrants from poor countries – both documented and irregular, including asylum-
seekers. 
 
The  small-island  context  allows  close  study  of  multiple  migration  processes  and  their 
interactions;  this  is  more  easily  visualized  within  the  insular  microcosm  where  the 
migration actor-groups listed above live in close geographical (but not necessarily social) 
proximity to each other. 
 
Several interesting research questions and hypotheses arise. Does the small-scale island 
society offer a welcoming environment where migrants (of various types) can easily settle, 
supported by personalized relationships which are easier to develop in a local, informal 
setting? Or are islands unwelcoming places to outsiders who are seen as potential threats to 
established  social  orders  and  networks  (see  Baldacchino,  2008b)?  Or  perhaps  some 
immigrant groups are welcomed, others tolerated, and others rejected? How is the key 
triangular  relationship  between  islanders,  wealthy  foreign  settlers  and  poor  labour 
immigrants played out? Are returnees ‘intermediaries’ between ‘natives’ and immigrants,                                                                        Geography, Islands and Migration 
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drawing  on  their  own  experiences  of  migration  to  broker  understanding  between  the 
various groups? 
 
As yet, there are very few island-based studies which provide answers to these questions. 
One exception is Salvà-Tomàs (2002) who has examined the relationship between tourism 
(largely from Germany and the UK) and labour migration (from Africa and South America) 
in the Balearic Islands, although his is largely a descriptive economic and demographic 
analysis,  not  one  based  on  primary  survey  or  ethnographic  data.  More  theoretically 
innovative is Bianchi’s (2000) study of the ‘tourist-worker nexus’ in the Canaries. Bianchi 
problematizes the distinction between tourists and tourist-industry workers by exploring 
the hybrid category of transient resort workers in the context of emergent patterns of post-
industrial  mobility  in  which  the  boundaries  between  work,  leisure  and  migration  are 
blurred. “Migrant tourist-workers are thus a distinct [group who] encompass aspects of 
both travel- and work-related mobilities in so far as they lodge their sense of identity in the 
pursuit of alternative, transient lifestyles, in which resort work and recreation are integral 
components” (2000: 122). Although this sociological category is not unique to ‘holiday 
islands’, the sense of escapism associated with island tourist destinations draws many such 
tourist-workers to island hot-spots such as San Antonio (Ibiza), Mykonos or Agia Napa 
(Cyprus),  where  seasonal  and  casual  jobs  as  tourist  reps,  nightclub  staff,  bar  workers, 
lifeguards etc. are fairly abundant. 
 
 
The Example of Malta 
 
Malta  epitomizes  both  the  island  migration  scenarios  referred  to  above:  the  mixing  of 
different migration actor-groups and types of migration within a small insular space and 
society; and the role of islands in the new spatial dynamics of clandestine migration into 
the EU. Of course, no island is ‘typical’ and Malta’s unique geo-historical features must be 
recognized, notably its extremely high population (for its size) and its harbour of special 
historical and military importance.  
 
The notion of Malta as ‘migration’s microcosm’ (Anon, 1964) is built on a long and varied 
historical sequence of migrations affecting the island. Malta’s function as an island fortress 
at the crossroads of the Mediterranean – part of a trio of British imperial defence-posts in 
the  Basin  along  with  Gibraltar  and  Cyprus  –  gave  the  island  a  rather  particular 
developmental and demographic history. The externalized economic base, on an island 
with few natural resources and an already-dense population, led to a rate of population 
increase which ultimately proved unsustainable, especially when the ‘fortress economy’ 
started to shrink after Britain’s global rundown of its military bases following the Suez 
debacle  in  1956.  However,  long  before  the  post-war  emigration  boom,  Malta  had  a 
tradition of exporting its surplus population, especially within the Mediterranean Basin via 
its  commercial  links  to  prominent  port-cities  such  as  Algiers,  Tunis,  Tripoli  (Libya), 
Marseilles and Constantinople (Istanbul)
8. Price (1954: 115) estimated that, by 1865, there 
were 40,000 Maltese living abroad, equivalent to 22% of the population. 
                                                 
8 An interesting sub-story concerns the Maltese settlers in French colonial Algeria who transplanted to France 
in the early-mid 1960s in the wake of Algerian independence. Andrea Smith’s recent monograph traces the R. King 
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This early migration failed to curtail a population growth rate which remained remarkably 
high for a European country (albeit a strongly Catholic one ideologically opposed to birth 
control) until well into the post-war era. According to the 1948 Census, one quarter of 
completed families had ten or more children, a proportion which dropped to one-fifth in 
the early 1960s, when average family size stood at six children per completed family. 
Meanwhile  the  death  and  infant  mortality  rates  dropped  vertiginously,  exacerbating 
population growth. During the late 1950s and early 1960s, births averaged 8,600 per year, 
deaths only 2,820, yielding a net annual increment to the population of nearly 6,000, or 2% 
of the population, very high for a country of Malta’s level of development and standard of 
living (King, 1979: 110-111). 
 
The push factors for Malta’s ‘great exodus’ during the three post-war decades were both 
demographic (high natural increase) and economic (contraction of the fortress economy), 
the former stressed by Jones (1973), the latter by Delia (1982). During 1946-74 there was 
an  exodus  of  138,000,  equivalent  to  44%  of  the  Maltese  population.  Four  destination 
countries absorbed these emigrants: Australia (58%), the United Kingdom (22%), Canada 
(13%) and the United States (7%). During the peak years of emigration – the 1950s and 
early 1960s – the rate approached one in 30 or 3% per year, the highest emigration rate in 
the world, according to Jones (1973). 
 
As  emigration  tailed  off  during  the  1970s,  two  new  migrations  appeared:  a  fairly 
substantial return migration of Maltese labour migrants (King, 1979; King & Strachan, 
1980), and the immigration of so-called ‘sixpenny settlers’. The latter were retired (often 
early-retired) British nationals, many with a military background, who were attracted to 
Malta by prior connections (such as wartime service there), its low tax rate (six old pence 
in the pound, or just 2.5 per cent), the warm and sunny climate, and its ‘British’ colonial 
flavour  (even  after  independence).  This  immigration  of  British  retirees  continued  into 
subsequent decades; in the mid-1990s the British High Commission estimated the size of 
the British population in Malta at 5,000 (Warnes & Patterson, 1998: 121). 
 
There is, however, a more dramatic and recent story of immigration into Malta. This is 
associated with the country’s entry into the EU in 2004, as well as with the above-noted re-
routing of African irregular migrants via Libya as a major new transit country
9. This new 
immigration trend was already evident in 2002, when Malta’s ‘European’ vocation, after 
years  of  debate  and  vacillation,  had  become  clear,  albeit  with  residual  overtones  of 
ambivalence (Baldacchino, 2002; Mitchell, 2002). During that year, 21 boats deposited 
                                                                                                                                                    
trials and tribulations of this ‘double migration’. In Algeria, the Maltese, previously colonized under British 
rule, were the poorest of the nineteenth-century European settler arrivals and were placed at the bottom of the 
settler  hierarchy.  After  their  transfer  to  France  (they  had  acquired  French  citizenship  in  Algeria)  they 
continued to be made to feel socially inferior and a people in exile, compensated only by their adherence to 
Maltese social clubs (Smith, 2006). 
9 According to the ICMPD (International Centre for Migration Policy Development, Vienna), this migration 
to Malta is part of a much wider Libyan-sourced boat migration of around 80,000 people per year, targeted at 
Sicily and Italy (quoted in Hamood, 2008: 19). Estimates of the total number of transit migrants ‘stockpiled’ 
in Libya range from 750,000 to 2 million. The migrants are mainly from adjacent countries in north-east and 
sub-Saharan Africa.                                                                        Geography, Islands and Migration 
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1,686 irregular migrants and asylum-seekers on the shores of Malta – a rate of arrival 
which has remained more or less constant, at around 1,700-2,000 per year, ever since. The 
main nationalities are Egyptians, Sudanese, Ethiopians, Eritreans and Somalis. 
 
The sea journey to Malta, for which migrants pay agents around US$1,000-1,200 (figures 
for  2003-05:  Hamood,  2008:  30),  follows  an  equally  perilous  and  much  longer  (but 
cheaper, US$60-180) overland journey on open trucks through the desert, crossing into 
Libya via unguarded border points. Ironically, most of the migrants arriving in Malta do 
not want to be there; their target is Italy and the open European space of the Schengen area. 
Their arrival in Malta is by mistake: they think, or are told by the pilots, that Malta is 
Sicily; or they are picked up if in danger by patrol-boats in Malta’s extensive search and 
rescue zone – a vast elongated rectangle which stretches from just off the coast of Tunisia 
nearly to Crete and which is hugely out of proportion to Malta’s size compared to the 
adjoining countries of Tunisia, Libya, Italy, and Greece (see the map in Texiere (2006: 42). 
The migrants are then ‘trapped’ in Malta because the rules of the Dublin convention state 
that  asylum  claims  must  be  processed  in  the  country  of  first  arrival,  with  no  onward 
mobility allowed for claimants, and because Malta (unlike Italy) has no return agreement 
with Libya (Hamood, 2008: 32-33). 
 
Immigration  has  rapidly  proved  to  be  a  challenging and  hotly  debated  issue  in  Malta, 
stirring up reactions which can certainly be labelled as xenophobic. Neil Falzon, United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees representative in Malta, has stated:  
 
“There’s an ugly xenophobia developing here and the government carries some 
responsibility for that. It is selling the idea that Malta can’t cope. The truth is it has 
to… The government should be leading the process of integrating [the immigrants] 
with jobs, education and homes instead of taking part in this national hysteria” 
(quoted in Jones, 2008). 
 
Although the debate on immigration in Malta is often expressed very simplistically, the 
underlying issues are complex. Undoubtedly there is a wider trope of ‘invasion’ which is 
linked  both  to  claims  of  smallness,  islandness  and  high  population  density;  and  to  a 
‘fortress history’ of fear of invasion, which also became apparent in debates surrounding 
EU accession in 2004 (Baldacchino, 2008b: 14). Immigration discourse is also refracted 
through historical templates of ‘race’ and ‘nation’ in which certain immigrants and visitors 
(especially tourists, Europeans, Christians) are accepted, whilst others (Africans, Arabs, 
Muslims)  are  not.  Yet  seeing  immigration  as  a  threat  to  Maltese  national  identity  is 
inherently problematic because of the very nature of the concept of identity – identities, 
pace  Stuart  Hall  (1996),  are  always  contested,  insecure,  manufactured,  processual, 
relational … – and because of the consequent difficulty of pinning down exactly what a 
Maltese national identity – if it exists – consists of (Abela, 2006; Baldacchino, 2002). 
Bearing in mind these inherent complexities surrounding the nature of Maltese national 
and cultural identity, I now proceed to try to analyse the discursive dynamics surrounding 
immigration more systematically. 
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The recent influx of irregular migrants challenges Maltese national identity and migration 
policy  in  three  ways.  First,  there  is  the  perceived  ‘intrusion’  of  migrants  of  different 
cultures, religions and skin colours, and mostly single young males, into a society which 
has generally regarded itself as homogenous, family-centred, staunchly Roman Catholic 
and  socially  conservative  (yet  also,  at  the  same  time,  progressive  towards  its  own 
disadvantaged  members).  But  this  homogeneity  is  tinged  with  an  inevitable  insecurity 
about national identity (Baldacchino, 2002, 2009; Mitchell, 2002). Who, exactly, are the 
Maltese?  What  are  their  defining  national  characteristics,  given  their  proclaimed 
Phoenician  heritage,  their  unique  language,  and  (yet)  their  subsequent  contact  with 
Arab/North  African,  Italian  and  British  colonial  spheres,  and  consequent  histories  of 
immigration?  According  to  Abela  (2006),  if  there  is  any  common  feature  of  Maltese 
identity, apart from the obvious attachment to their ‘island place’, it is the Catholic Church, 
which  provides  an  overarching  umbrella  of  ontological  security  for  the  family  of  the 
Maltese people, as well as symbolic visual dominance in the scale of the monumental 
churches  rising  over  Maltese  small  towns  and  villages.  Cassar  (2000)  has  shown  that, 
historically, Catholic Christian narratives and imagery have not only played a central role 
in the construction and maintenance of national identity but also have been deployed to 
guide debates on morality, welfare and social responsibility – including those relating to 
migration. Migration links, in both directions, between Malta and Sicily were particularly 
intense during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries (Cassar, 2000: 95-120).  
 
Immigrants, therefore, are seen as a potential disruption of this fragile Maltese identity 
with its unique but beleaguered culture and language. But there are at least two ironies here. 
The first is to do with the nature of Maltese Catholicism. On the one hand there are very 
high levels of church attendance and unusually high levels of charity donations to worthy 
causes, both at home and in the ‘Third World’. But when the Third World comes to Malta 
in the embodiment of dark-skinned immigrants, the charity turns to xenophobia, as noted 
above. The second irony is the failure to make connections between the Maltese experience 
of mass emigration and the plight of immigrants arriving in Malta
10. One further irony 
connects the previous two, and this is the role of certain liberal Catholic organizations, 
such as the Emigrants Commission (originally founded to support Maltese emigrants) and 
the Jesuit Refugee Service in acting as providers of important welfare and support services 
to immigrants and asylum-seekers
11. 
 
The  second  discursive  framing  of  irregular  migration  and  asylum-seekers  concerns  the 
question  of  numbers;  the  notion  that  “we  can’t  all  live  on  this  small  island”.  It  is 
undeniable that Malta has the highest population density of any EU country: 400,000 on 
just  316  square  kilometres  of  strategically  located  but  agriculturally  infertile  limestone 
                                                 
10 Of course, there are differences as well as similarities here. Apologists for not appreciating the parallels 
would point to the nature of Maltese emigration as a well-organized and sponsored movement within the 
anglophone world, in contrast to the spontaneous and disorganized arrival of boat migrants. 
11 As Mark-Anthony Falzon (2007) has recently shown, this exemplifies a much wider welfare role that the 
Catholic Church has long played in Malta. Despite periods of schism between the Church and State – as 
under Dom Mintoff during the 1970s when elements of a workers’ welfare state were put in place – the 
Church-State symbiosis has been well entrenched in Maltese society (if not in overt politics). Recently, under 
a  new  regime  of  ‘welfare  pluralism’  the  Church  has  been  well  placed  to  take  on  new  welfare  roles  – 
including helping immigrants and asylum-seekers.                                                                        Geography, Islands and Migration 
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rock. Although the annual influx of more than 1 million tourists is welcomed because of 
the importance of tourism for the economy and because, of course, the tourists go home, 
the annual arrival of 2,000 ‘illegal’ immigrants who will not, or cannot, return home, is 
seen as a more vital component in the numbers game. In Malta, it is often pointed out that 
the impact of 2,000 immigrants on a population of 400,000 is equivalent to the annual 
arrival of 300,000 boat migrants in Italy or 200,000 in Spain. Or, put another way, the 
11,500  refugees  and  irregular  migrants  processed  since  2002  corresponds  to  about  1.7 
million arriving in the UK, France or Italy (Jones, 2008). A further layer of this discourse 
reflects  Malta’s  self-perception  as  a  ‘less-developed  country’  in  European  terms,  and 
therefore ill-equipped to deal with the migrant influx. Here the contrast is drawn with other, 
more wealthy European countries where it is explicitly acknowledged that migrants have a 
valuable  economic  function  in  the  labour  market,  filling  jobs  that  native  workers  are 
unwilling to do, such as in agriculture or construction
12. 
 
This leads to the third, and by far the most complex, challenge: the policy response. This in 
turn  has  two  dimensions:  internal  policy  measures  for  the  reception,  processing, 
accommodation  and  integration  of  migrants  and  refugees;  and  the  external  policy 
environment of the EU and bilateral relations with sending and transit countries, notably 
Libya. 
 
What  is  clear  from  the  few  existing  studies  of  the  phenomenon  of  Malta’s  ‘new 
immigration’ (King & Thomson, 2008; Spiteri, 2004; Texiere, 2006; Thomson, 2006) is 
that the country was unprepared for those who, echoing the biblical shipwreck of St. Paul, 
washed up on the shores of Malta in the early 2000s
13. Although on paper the figures for 
the  eventual  confirmation  of  refugee  and  humanitarian  protection  status  are  rather 
impressive  by  southern  European  standards  (Thomson,  2006:  6),  the  way  the  irregular 
immigrants and asylum-seekers have been accommodated has been widely condemned
14. 
For  up  to  18  months  (now  reduced  to  12)  they  are  held  in  overcrowded  and  poorly-
equipped  detention  camps  (which  are  former  military  barracks)  under  the  control  of 
soldiers  who  are  trained  in  warfare  not  humanitarian  work.  Subsequently  they  can  be 
‘released into the community’ which usually means they are transferred to ‘open centres’ 
from which they can obtain a work permit and seek work
15. There are no real policies or 
measures for integration and welfare beyond those offered by charitable bodies. 
                                                 
12 Of course, the economic utility of migrants in other European countries does not prevent them from being 
subject to racism and discrimination, or even framed as targets for governmental rhetoric. 
13 This is a process which continues today, with tragic consequences. In late August 2008 reports were filed 
of 70 migrants, Sudanese and Eritreans, losing their lives in rough sea south of Malta when their flimsy boat 
foundered on its perilous journey from Libya (see The Guardian, 28 August 2008). 
14 Things came to a head with a violent incident at the Safi barracks detention centre in January 2005, when a 
peaceful demonstration by the migrant inmates against their inhuman treatment and living conditions was 
brutally repressed by soldiers and the police (Texiere, 2006: 84-90). More recently, reporting on an EU-
commissioned  study,  the  Times  of  Malta  wrote  (13  January  2008):  “The  centres  for  immigrants  are 
overcrowded,  riddled  with  poor  hygiene,  arbitrary  regimes,  deficient  healthcare,  information  and  legal 
systems,  and  lack  of  interpreters…  Malta’s  repressive  measures  to  try  and  stem  illegal  immigration  are 
dehumanising and ineffective, and will neither stop the migratory flow, nor protect the country’s interests”. 
15 Conditions in the open centres are little better than in the detention camps. A quote from The Guardian of 
30 December 2008: “About half of the 4,000 migrants who have been released from detention live in two 
cramped,  unsanitary  open  centres  which  are  effectively  African  ghettos…  Railing  rust  bleeds  down  the R. King 
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The issue of irregular migration has also had an impact on the domestic political scene, 
boosting the influence of the right-wing Alleanza Nazzjonali (National Alliance) for whom 
immigration represents a threat, in their own words, to ‘Maltese values of faith, nationhood 
and family’. Public protests against irregular migration have led to clashes in the main 
square  of  the  capital  Valletta  between  right-wing  campaigners  and  anti-racist  groups. 
Further  rhetorical  fuel  has  been  thrown  on  the  fiery  debate  over  immigration  by  the 
extremist Imperium Europa group which espouses a white supremacist European credo. 
Articles and letters in Maltese newspapers further reveal the naïveté of the discussion on 
immigration, with tired allusions to crime and disease, religious fanaticism and clashes of 
cultures (Spiteri, 2004). These anti-immigrant  movements carry only  minimal electoral 
support, but their voice has enhanced importance in the context of the knife-edge balance 
of power between Malta’s two long-established centrist political parties, the Nationalist 
Party and the Malta Labour Party (Baldacchino, 2008b). 
 
Malta’s  external  policy  challenge  involves  convincing  the  EU  that  it  deserves  special 
treatment and assistance due to the disproportionate ‘burden’ of immigration that it has to 
bear by virtue of its four undeniable geographical features: small size, dense population, 
location close to the North African coast, and its huge area of maritime responsibility. At 
the negotiations for the EU entry, Malta did secure two derogations  which reflected a 
different concern – immigration from other EU countries, such as Italy where there was 
fear of the immigration of unemployed Sicilians. The two exception clauses were a ban on 
foreigners purchasing second homes in Malta, and a seven-year moratorium on the free 
entry of EU workers (with permits only granted in exceptional circumstances for a specific 
purpose).  Less  success  has  been  gained  in  relaxing  the  rules  of  the  1990  Dublin 
Convention, which effectively traps migrants in Malta, against the wishes of the Maltese 
authorities  and  of  the  migrants  themselves,  who  want  to  move  north.  And  a  bilateral 
agreement with Libya allowing Malta to send irregular migrants back has so far proved 
elusive, as have requests to the Libyans to control the departure of boats from their shores. 
 
Recent attempts by Italy, Greece, Malta and Cyprus to establish a greater EU commitment 
to ‘burden-sharing’ over the issue of Mediterranean ‘boat-people’ migrants have yielded 
few concrete results. Winter arrivals in late 2008 on the islands of Lampedusa and Linosa, 
close to Malta, prompted a strong burst of rhetoric from Italy’s interior minister Roberto 
Maroni;  if  his  pressure  on  the  Libyan  leadership,  linked  to  a  programme  of  Italian 
investment in Libya agreed in August 2008, bears fruit and Gaddafi follows through with 
the quid pro quo of joint coastal patrols of Libya, then Malta might also ‘benefit’ from 
reduced arrivals (Hooper, 2008). 
 
So, does Malta need immigrants? Is there a structural need for migrant workers in the 
Maltese labour market? One straight answer might be ‘Yes’, simply because Malta is like 
                                                                                                                                                    
whitewashed walls of Marsa, a dilapidated former school converted into an open centre… More than 1,200 
migrants take turn to sleep in bunks and share putrid lavatories and showers. The building is divided into 
ethnic blocks run by Somalis, Sudanese or West Africans. For the fortunate few it is a stopping point before 
they find a regular salary to rent more salubrious accommodation. For others, Marsa is a symbol of their 
frustrated hopes… at least one migrant attempts suicide each month”.                                                                        Geography, Islands and Migration 
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any other developed and regulated market economy that is looking to lower production 
costs. But labour migration is not an absolutely inevitable accompaniment of capitalist 
success as the case of Finland – one of the most prosperous countries in the EU but with 
very few labour immigrants – shows (Bartram 2007). For Malta, opinions and evidence 
differ; we await a thorough study on this question. Certainly there is ‘soft’ evidence on the 
presence of a number of immigrant groups beyond the mainly African asylum-seekers and 
irregular migrants discussed above. There is a Libyan presence which has its roots in the 
1970s when prime minister Dom Mintoff’s pro-Libyan stance brought Libyan teachers to 
Malta to teach Arabic in the local schools. As Libya became even more a pariah state in the 
wake of the 1988 Lockerbie incident, Libyans continued to have visa-free access to Malta 
until Malta turned towards Europe in the late 1990s. An older-established but small Indian 
trader community also contributes to Malta’s very embryonic multicultural society (Falzon, 
2001). Evidence exists for various East European and Middle Eastern migrants working in 
construction (men) and the hospitality industry (women), and there are Nigerians in the 
local football teams (Thomson, 2006: 7-8). But in general Malta has a long way to go 
before it reaches the degree of immigrant penetration into the labour market that has been 
achieved in other southern EU countries such as Spain, Italy, Greece and Cyprus (King & 
Thomson, 2008). 
 
Coming back to the central theme of this paper, the Maltese case illustrates a fundamental 
dilemma at the heart of the relationship between small islands and migration: islands tend 
to be ‘good’ at emigration, because that has been their livelihood for generations; but ‘bad’ 
at coping with new immigration, certainly if the latter is on a large scale proportionate to 
the island’s population. Other factors also help to explain this anomaly. Partly the situation 
has to do with the asymmetry in the migratory relationship between islands and the rest of 
the world: 100,000 Maltese migrants distributed between four big countries (Australia, 
Canada, the USA, Britain) have little visibility there; but even 10,000 immigrants in Malta 
would have high visibility. Moreover the changing geopolitical situation of Malta also is 
important, as in the combination of EU membership with its geographical positionality at 
the ‘underbelly’ of the Union, close to migrant-source routes. 
   
 
Conclusion 
 
This paper has argued for a new generation of island migration studies: one which no 
longer focuses on emigration, depopulation, island diasporas and return migration, but on 
islands’  new  role  in  global  relations  and  on  the  changing  geopolitics  of  international 
migration control. In this conclusion, I revisit some of the key points I have made and try 
to set them within wider theoretical and methodological debates. 
 
First, I have argued that islands can continue to function as a privileged laboratory for 
migration studies. As the nature of mobility changes in the ‘age of global migration’, and 
as new paradigms reshape the focus of migration researchers in their quest to understand 
the  changing  nature  and  geography  of  global  mobility,  the  heuristic  role  of  islands  as 
spatial laboratories remains full of (mostly unrealized) potential. This much is consistent R. King 
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with what I have argued in the past (see King, 1999; also Connell & King, 1999). But this 
view should not pass unchallenged, and therefore needs further nuancing and justification. 
 
Clifford  Geertz  critiqued  the  ‘spatial  laboratory’  theme  in  his  ‘thick  description’ 
introduction  to  his  1973  classic  The  Interpretation  of  Cultures.  Later  works  by 
anthropologists such as Marcus (1995) and Candea (2007) also debate the issue of the 
relevance of the local, small-scale place or community. Although those authors rarely refer 
to the specificity of a small island as such a bounded site, what they say has relevance for 
the island-as-spatial-microcosm approach
16. Marcus’ often-cited essay on the emergence of 
multi-sited  ethnography  marked  the  passage  from  the  traditional  imaginary  of 
anthropological  fieldwork  carried  out  in  a  single-site  location  to  a  more  dynamic 
ethnography  contextualized  by  the  structurings  of  a  larger  social  order,  above  all  the 
capitalist world system. Hence ‘the local’ could only be understood – and researched – 
with reference to observations sited elsewhere in the global system. As tracking strategies 
he suggested following ‘the people’ (as in migration and mobility), the ‘thing’ (as in a 
commodity chain), the biography (as in life-history studies), or following the metaphor, 
story or conflict (Marcus, 1995: 106-110). 
 
Second, I have pointed to the new function of islands arising from their strategic location 
as  stepping-stones  on  routes  of  irregular  migration  which  are  themselves  constantly 
shifting in response to ‘official’ migration control strategies. We noted how some islands – 
Malta, Lampedusa and the Canaries were specifically mentioned – acquire new salience as 
critical spaces in the continually changing geography of irregular migration routes from 
Africa and the Near East to Europe. Sometimes such islands – particularly the larger, more 
prosperous ones like Sicily, Majorca or Cyprus – are the end-destinations of migrants, but 
more often they are places en route to somewhere else: liminal spaces where they may 
quickly pass through, or perch for a while, like migrating birds, or get stuck (as in Malta), 
unable to move on, yet unwilling to turn back.  
 
The debate on multi-locality launched by Marcus (1995) also allows us to combine in a 
fruitful way two key approaches to the island-migration nexus. Candea’s (2007) rejoinder 
to  Marcus  re-emphasized  the  importance  of  the  ‘bounded  location’  for  ethnographic 
enquiry,  either as a single site or as multiple, discrete locations which have their own 
consistency and meaning – the village, the neighbourhood, the tribal territory or, one might 
add, the (small) island. On the other hand such ‘traditional’ anthropological field-sites are 
also arbitrary locations which function as heuristic devices which, in turn, are not so much 
‘ideal types’ or closed-system spatial laboratories; but, rather, reflect “actually existing 
instances,  whose  messiness,  contingency,  and  lack  of  an  overwhelming  coherence  or 
meaning serve as a ‘control’ for a broader object of study” (Candea, 2007: 180) – in our 
case, migration. Hierarchy of scale becomes important here, as the small, bounded field-
site might indeed be a small island which functions, like a rural village, as a ‘coherent 
community’; or the island (Malta, Corsica…) might be large enough to be composed of 
several  small  communities  yet  for  there  still  to  be  present  a  marked  insular  identity 
amongst its inhabitants. 
                                                 
16 It is true that Candea’s sympathetic critique of Marcus is based on empirical research in Corsica, but the 
referent is one village – the ‘bounded field-site’ – on this rather large island.                                                                        Geography, Islands and Migration 
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Marcus’ line of argument fits closely with my alternative suggestion for seeing islands not, 
in this instance, as semi-closed systems or small-scale laboratories for social research, but 
as critically placed nodes within much broader dynamics linking wider spatial realms and 
processes, potentially global in scale. By its very nature, migration links islands to other 
places; indeed migration is the most obvious exemplification of the need for multi-sited 
research, since there is always a ‘here’ and a ‘there’ involved. This, surely, is the attraction 
of islands for migration researchers (and the attraction of migration for island researchers). 
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